Case Against Party Discipline in Canada

Canada, as one of the oldest continuous democracies on the planet, stands as a prime example of a democratic culture. The Canadian political system, inherited from the British Empire, is based on the Westminster parliamentary tradition, which fosters political efficiency and cohesion. However, Canada is a famous outlier among its Westminster parliamentary peers. The elitism, manifested in the enormous power held by political party leaders, is incomparable to that of other developed democracies. Reports found that MPs are voting with the main line of their parties 99.6% of the time, a statistic that is, and should be, referred to as “unhealthy partisanship.” Moreover, based on the latest Canadian Democratic Audit, powers held by the Canadian Prime Minister are significantly surpassing those of the PMs of countries with similar systems (notably the UK and Australia). 

All the above-mentioned features of the Canadian political system are, at least partially, based on the strict party discipline within major Canadian political parties. This phenomenon, acknowledged by both the Canadian public and academics, is eroding trust in the political system and decreasing already minuscule numbers of political participants. Hence, this article will provide a theoretical case against strong party discipline, which would outline the potential benefits of its relaxation. Moreover, with the understanding that a pure theory can only go so far in a country with strong and old democratic traditions, I would outline a practical case that would not demand swift and radical changes to the system at large. With these recommendations, I believe that Canada can cease to be an example of the “iron law of oligarchy,” reinforce belief in political institutions and retain its global democratic appeal. 

In order to craft a convincing theoretical case, I would have to briefly outline what party discipline is and how it affects Canadian democracy. As simply phrased by an official governmental report, “the practise of party discipline means that members of the same party vote together in Parliament.” Two main purposes of party disciplines are the clear line of demarcation between the Government and the Opposition and ideological certainty for voters.

As this principle clearly confronts the idea of representation of constituencies and practically reduces MPs to “rubber stamps,” a number of reforms were proposed to reduce the level of party discipline. Most prominent was the introduction of free vote, a type of vote that needed to be officially declared beforehand. Under free vote, MPs were free in their choice. However, they are mostly occasional outliners and did not produce a meaningful change to the system at large. Hence, the proposed theoretical case aims to illustrate why further reforms are necessary and show how everyone would benefit from it.

While this principle exists in most democratic countries, the level of discipline in Canada is unparalleled. As stated by Dyck Rand, Canadian political party discipline is an example of the “iron rule of oligarchy,” under which MPs are expected to toe the party line with minimum deviation.¹ Despite apparent similarities to other countries with Westminster’s political system, like the existence of the Party Whip, Canadian MPs have an unmatched level of conformity. As illustrated in the study by Christopher Garner, the level of dissent, a vote against party line, in Great Britain is bigger by a magnitude of three in comparison to Canada. Therefore, constituencies in Great Britain have a greater level of meaningful representation in the Parliament, as the wishes of local voters often override the party line.

Theoretically, MPs in Canada are also elected to represent their constituencies, but under the current system, they are forced to support policies that might not align with the wishes of their electors. This creates a disconnect between the electorate and their representatives, undermining the very purpose of representative democracy. The political reform that would allow greater autonomy for MPs would not only improve the overall theoretical character of Canadian democracy but also engender local political participation, as people would understand that their voices are better represented. Hence, in theory, the relaxation of the party discipline is to the benefit of voters.

Another benefit of the relaxation of party discipline is the improvement of inner-party dialogue. Under the current system, any meaningful dissent is discouraged by punishments like reduced work opportunities or, in some cases, refusal to allow to run in the future election under the party banner. This gives enormous power to party leaders, who use it to stifle inner-party debate, containing it to party caucuses so it would not go public. On the one hand, this allows the crafting of an image of unanimous support for the leader and his course, which theoretically can provide more stability. On the other, it disallows the party to adjust its course, as party leaders can simply continue what they had planned.

A prominent example is the negligence towards the Liberal Party by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who relied solely on the government apparatus, diminishing the importance of the party in the political arena. This type of action leads to the disillusionment of regular party members, as they might feel that their voices are not heard, which further diminishes already small numbers of party participants. The reduction in party discipline would engender a rebirth of pubic inner-party dialogue and make parties more flexible in general. Hence, in theory, it is to the benefit of the regular party members. 

However, despite the apparent benefits of the theoretical case against strong party discipline, the system has its defenders in political, academic and public spaces. Most notably, not everyone is better off with the relaxation of party discipline. The strongest political figure in the country, the Prime Minister, would lose some of the power that the position currently holds. However, the Canadian PMs are already the strongest leaders in developed democratic countries, and the decrease in power that this proposition would provide most likely would not diminish the Prime Minister’s significance to the point of political instability. Moreover, the interest of one person at any given time should not override the interest of the millions of rest, especially in a democratic country.

Another prominent counter-argument is the idea that the Parliament would become less stable. Indeed, looking at European democracies with a large number of different parties and constant reshuffle of power, one might rightfully admire Canadian political stability. Moreover, it can be partially attributed to the control that the political leader holds over his party. However, Canada is not Europe, nor our political system is similar to theirs. While the relaxation of the party discipline might make the voting process in parliament less predictable, it does not diminish the strong tendency towards two-party stability that the first-pass-the-post voting system brings. If anything, the relaxation of party discipline would reinforce this majority government tendency, as people with similar yet not identical views can better consolidate under one banner.

Proponents of party discipline often state that it would make it easier for the party to depose the current leader under the proposed system. While it is theoretically possible, practical examples of the English Parliament show that even controversial leaders, like Margaret Thatcher, can withstand this tendency even during times of political crisis. Indeed, the deposition of the party leader is more common in the UK than in Canada. However, it is only because it rarely happens in Canada. While the above-mentioned examples provide a practical reason, from a theoretical standpoint, it is not necessarily a problem that the leader who became so unpopular to lose the support of his party can be replaced in a democracy.

Lastly, as stated previously, one of the reasons for the existence of the party discipline is the voter’s ideological certainty. Some argue that voters expect their representatives to follow a predictable ideological voting pattern, which party discipline can provide. While this might be the case for some people, others might want their representatives to be the voice of their particular community rather than an ideological voice. Hence, the logic behind the counter-argument is not that straightforward, especially given that even with the weaker party discipline, ideological differences between parties would still exist.

While the theoretical case is compelling, the vision it proposes and its recommendations are idealistic and vague and can only ever be used as a guiding star of more practical endeavours.  This is especially the case in a country with strong and old political traditions like Canada, as any vague and idealistic visions can be too radical and disruptive to the system that, overall, works great. Hence, the article will outline more practical implications of such a change and its benefits can be yielded today. As the question of partisan structure is not a matter of the government legislature, I would outline how the Liberal Party would benefit greatly from the implementation of the proposed system.

The Liberal Party stands to gain the most from a relaxation of party discipline. To start with, as Canadian political culture has a strong tendency towards long-lasting political leadership, the strong discipline only reinforces the political grip that the leader has over the party. Hence, even in the case of the diminishing popularity of a particular leader and his vision within Canada, it would limit the electoral prospects of individual MPs, as voters perceive the leader as the primary decision-maker within the party. Hence, the relaxation and an open declaration would allow local MPs to construct their individual platform uniquely tailored to their constituency, which would enhance their election chances. 

Moreover, the support of the current PM, Justin Trudeau, is abysmal 24%, with 59% being openly negative. This has a negative effect on every local Liberal MP chance for re-election. However, 9% of the conservative voters stated that they are willing to change their vote if Trudeau is no longer the leader, an astonishing fact that is complemented by 30% of NDP and Green voters who are ready to vote Liberals just to not let Conservatives into the Government. All these statistics show that people, especially those uncertain, are willing to vote for Liberals; however, they are appalled by Trudeau himself. The relaxation of party politics would allow MPs to attract those voters personally or, if needed, more easily replace unpopular leaders to increase their winning chances.

The winning chances are also complimented by the fact that in the winner-takes-all first-pass-the-post voting system, there is a strong incentive to consolidate around one party with the strongest chances of winning. Hence, if the party discipline within the Liberal Party is relaxed and inner-party debate and dialogue becomes open and public, the reason for the existence of smaller left-leaning parties, like Green and NDP, for all practical reasons disappears. With the proposed change, they can become niche factions within a larger union of the Liberal Party. Hence, this would reduce the fragmentation of the left-wing vote, which would provide a higher chance of winning the election for the Liberal party.

Lastly, a relaxed party discipline could strengthen the Liberal Party’s claim to be a party of the people. By embracing internal debate and allowing for diverse viewpoints within the party, the Liberals could create a strong political precedent, showing a commitment to democratic principles. This approach would be similar to Trudeau’s earlier promise of electoral reform, which resonated with many voters as a commitment to improving Canadian democracy.

Similar practical arguments can be applied to the Conservative Party. The relaxation of the party discipline would further consolidate right-leaning forces and voters, eliminate the need for PPC and allow local MPs to craft their own platform. However, the situation that the Conservative Party finds itself in is far more favourable than the Liberal party. Their current leader, Pierre Poilievre, enjoys a healthy 40-42% popular support that surpasses 35% of negative attitudes towards him.

Moreover, the broad conservative movement is still rather consolidated, with the only prominent outlier being PPC, which has an astonishing 0 seats in Parliament and little to no impact in local constituencies. Hence, while theoretically, the Conservative Party will benefit in the long run from the proposed change, it is not practical nor in their immediate interest to do so, as it might promote a similar response from the Liberal Party, which would harvest more considerable gains from it.

The Canadian political system has provided centuries of stability and efficiency. However, the system’s unique emphasis on party discipline has also created significant challenges, most notably in democratic representation and the concentration of power in the hands of party leaders. This article provides a case, both theoretical and practical, against a strict party discipline by outlining potential public and political benefits. This approach could foster a more open, democratic, and responsive political system, reinforcing trust in political institutions in Canada. Moreover, the Liberal Party, the current party in power, stands to benefit practically from the adoption of this approach as this would enhance their internal cohesion, improve their electoral prospects, and reduce the centralization of power in party leaders. Ultimately, the relaxation of the party discipline is a strong theoretical and practical necessity for a continuous, yet gradual, improvement of Canadian political institutions. 

1. 1. Cochrane, Christopher, Kelly Blidook and Rand Dyck. 2017. Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches. 8th Edition. Nelson Education Ltd.
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