Critique of Neorealism: How Neorealism Betrayed Its Foundational Insight

The neorealist theory of International Relations (IR) has dominated academic and political thought during most of the 20th century. Many vital decisions of the Cold War were made on the advice of people influenced by neorealism, such as Henry Kissinger and Robert S. McNamara. Yet, the disastrously wrong predictions of the theory and its followers on the fate of the Soviet Union in the 1990s diminished the overall influence of neorealism for at least a decade. However, the War on Terror, the Rise of China and Russian hostilities towards its neighbours, such as Ukraine and Georgia, had reintroduced the neorealist theory to prominence.

The rising popularity of the theory in the time of rising international conflict should come as no surprise, given that NeoRealism originated from discussions on the causes of war. Kenneth Waltz, in his 1959 thesis Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, outlined the theory’s foundation and its operability when it comes to the analysis of war. However, as the theory progressed through the 20th century, its overall implications were extrapolated onto all aspects of international relations by various prominent scholars and, notably, Waltz himself.

Yet, it is peculiar to discover that in the process of acquiring broader applicability in IR, neorealist theory had seemingly forgotten its foundational arguments. This article aims to point out how the evolution of the neorealist theory discarded its foundational argument and elucidate how essential the implications of it are.

The root of neorealism (sometimes referred to as structural realism) was derived from one of the most essential questions in political theory: “Why do we have wars?” Kenneth Waltz was tackling this specific problem. In his analysis, Waltz outlined that answers to this question can be broadly grouped into three distinct levels of analysis, or, in his terms, images. The first image, with an emphasis on individual-level factors, such as human nature; the second image, with an emphasis on state-level factors, such as the type of state; and the third image, with an emphasis on interstate structural factors, such as the nature of the international arena. 

Through his analysis, Waltz identified that war as a phenomenon can only be explained through the third image. As the structure of the international arena is anarchical, meaning no power exists higher than states themselves, there is nothing to prevent war from happening if one state desires it. This particular observation is a key pillar of neorealism. If the underlying cause of war as a phenomenon lies in the structure of the international arena, then the sole focus of the IR academia should be on the interstate level of analysis.

Later, this observation was extrapolated onto IR as a whole, as Waltz and John Mearsheimer presented two competing theories of neorealism that explain all states’ actions through the nature of the structure of the international arena. Waltz argued for a defensive realism, in which states seek to achieve survival through a delicate balance of power. Mearsheimer proposed the theory of offensive realism, in which states seek survival through the acquisition of more power and regional hegemony. In both theories, all actions and all motivations of states are explained solely by the international anarchical structure (and the inherent desire of survival), which forces states to act in a certain way.

The fact that Waltz extrapolated this observation to all states’ actions is surprising because it contradicts his 1959 thesis. Indeed, he argued that the war as a phenomenon can be explained by the inability of the international anarchical structure to prevent it. However, he differentiated between war as a phenomenon and war as a particular. By the former, he described war in general, meaning why people go to war. By the latter, he meant any specific war, meaning why a particular war started at a particular time. Waltz posited that war as a particular can only be explained through first or second images. Hence, through individual and state-level variables, such as ideology, personality of leaders, decision-making process, etc. 

This seemingly small statement was vastly overshadowed by the observation that war as a phenomenon can only be explained from the third image. Yet, with this statement in mind, the extrapolation of the Waltz argument to all actions of states does not work. If particular wars require individual or domestic-level explanations, then so do many other state actions.

It can be argued that, for the sake of survival, states often engage in power balancing or alliance formation, which the structure of the international arena can explain. Yet, it is evident that particular leaders can defy the logic of the global arena due to their character traits, ideology, etc. This can be best exemplified by the abrupt and massive change in international relations with the re-election of Donald Trump in 2024. It would be challenging to argue that, if Kamala Harris won the election, US international decisions would be similar or the same as Trump’s, because the neorealism approach them as forced.

The implications of Waltz’s forgotten argument are huge. To exemplify, when Emmanuel Karagiannis, a neorealist scholar, analyzed the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, he overlooked personal tensions between Saakashvili and Putin. This made his analysis incapable of explaining why the war happened at the specific time and why immediate escalations were started by Saakashvili (president of Georgia), not Russia.

The analysis of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, and subsequently of that in 2022, by Mearsheimer suffers from similar perils of neorealism. Mearsheimer is unable to address the complex history between the two states and, most importantly, is hesitant to account for the will of the people in non-great power states. For him, the causes of the war can be summed up by the great power competition between the US and Russia.

Lastly, it is essential to point out that neorealist scholars appear to understand the inherent problem of their theory, although they are hesitant to amend it. To exemplify, Mearsheimer wrote extensively on the influence of the Israel lobby (a second image variable) on the US’s decision-making. The reason why neorealist scholars still acknowledge the importance of non-third image variables comes from their theories’ claim of non-normativity. As neorealism is argued to be purely positive, meaning it does not deal with questions of how something “ought” to be, scholars like Mearsheimer cannot ever critique the decision of any government. If it is all explained by the structure of the international arena, all decisions are forced.

Yet, Mearsheimer often criticizes the US’s leadership, as exemplified by the War on Terror and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Therefore, neorealist scholars sometimes acknowledge the importance of the first and second image variables when needed. However, it comes into direct contradiction with their own theory.

The analysis of the implications of Waltz’s overlooked argument for neorealist theory highlights a broader issue in political science. The logical soundness and practical applicability are often sacrificed for simplicity. Both Waltz and Mearsheimer advocated for parsimony, the idea that theory should explain the maximum number of phenomena with the fewest variables. This leads scholars to promote theories that they know are, at best, incomplete, which leads to an apparent disciplinary failure to engage with complexity. Unfortunately, this approach diminishes trust in political science as a discipline.