Philosophical Origins of Identity Politics

It is difficult to understand our contemporary North American society, without serious investigation of one of its main drivers of transformation – identity. The considerations of identity took precedence in cinematography, literature, academia, government and many other institutions. Identity became a central part of the politics both for right and left wing politicians. For example, within American conservative movement, previously dominant neoconservative ideas (Freedom Conservatism) visibly gave way to national conservatism¹ (this transformation did not yet happen in Canada), focusing on American identity (and in extreme cases on racial). The same process is happening on the Left, where universalist liberals in mainstream and Marxists in academia are being replaced by identity-obsessed woke politicians and ideologues.

The purpose of this post is to organize and structure my own notes on the philosophical genealogy of politics of identity. This piece will explore the Western thought that influenced the emergence of politics of identity in its present form, and it is first necessary to start with definitions..

Obviously, “identity” is the first concept which requires a clear definition, and Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor is the best reference on this question. For him, identity refers to the conception of self in relation to the external world. According to Taylor², it is formed “dialogically” by continuous interaction with others and can change through “negotiation” within the self and with the surrounding world. Moreover, it can be individual (individual versus the others) or collective (a group versus the others). Furthermore, one’s identity is shaped by its recognition, absence of recognition, or misrecognition by others. Recognition is a concept that elucidates identity and identity politics. 

The term identity politics has multiple meanings and connotations. Generally, politics of identity refers to policies and practices in political, corporate, academic, and cultural domains that aim to address inequities based on racial, ethnic, sexual, gender, religious, or class identity. Politics of identity tends to emphasize the importance of particular groups by promoting a sense of pride and belonging. It may involve “equity measures” such as affirmative action, “decolonization” of the Universities and their curricula, ejection or complete ban of works of art considered offensive, and even toppling of statutes of historical figures deemed “evil” by certain groups³, all in the name of “historical justice,” inclusion and diversity. In other words, identity politics is not an Enlightenment strife for equality but for equity, for equal outcomes for all groups regardless of their achievement or talent.  

Woke is a broad term that refers to multiple, at times contradictory, sets of ideas based on the belief in equal outcomes and vigilant psychological protection. It is characterized by a particular focus on “marginalized race and sexual identity groups, as well as women,”⁴ and runs into the same contradictionls and inconsistencies as a commonly-accepted term “Global South.” In academia, woke is often associated with the disciplines of Gender Studies and Critical Race Theory (CRT) but may also include the nascent Fat studies and Animal studies. This movement is not homogenous regarding its approach to identities, ranging from criticism and rejection (Judith Butler in Gender Studies) to appreciation and further reinforcement (Kimberlé Crenshaw in CRT).

To understand how identities, identity politics, and the woke movement became essential parts of public and private lives, it is necessary to evaluate how these notions evolved over time in conjunction with the concept of recognition. 

According to Francis Fukuyama, at the roots of the modern understanding of identities are the concepts of thymos and the separation of inner and outer selves established by Plato and Martin Luther, respectively. Thymos refers to the “third part of the soul,” the part desiring recognition. The first part of the soul is calculating, and the second is desiring. Thymos makes a person angry when the need is unmet, happy when it is, and ashamed when the person does not reach the standard of the desired recognition. Several centuries later, Martin Luther made another essential contribution to developing the modern concept of identity when he accused the Catholic Church of focusing on the external aspects of humans and religion: ritual and good deeds. He argued that true Christian salvation and connection with God happen through faith deep inside each person. He asserted that no external thing has any influence in producing Christian righteousness or freedom and that only the inner man could be renewed. Thus, he separated the inner and outer selves and prioritized the former over the latter. 

The following two philosophers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Johann Gottfried von Herder, were instrumental in the crystallization of the notion of identity and tied thymos to inner-outer self dichotomies. Rousseau adapted Luther’s “inner self” idea, secularized it by removing divinity from the picture, and declared that it is the essence of a person. In contrast to Luther, who considered that the inner essence was inherently sinful and required control, Rousseau regarded that the inner self should be uncovered, freed from external pressures, and embraced to achieve what he called “le sentiment de l’existence.” Today, this notion is deeply internalized by many people. Some scholars of the left tradition refer to the gendered, racialized, and oppressive society that hampers a person’s ability to be authentic, to connect with the true moral self, found deep within each person⁵. 

Furthermore, according to Herder, each person and nation must pursue a distinct and autonomous path, separate and independent of others, and in case of deviation from it, it misses the point of life. Taylor considers the German philosopher the founder of ethnonationalism and cultural relativism, as no one gave so much moral significance to the differences between people and nations before him. It partially explains his support for the French Revolution, which became a focal point in the evolution of identity and recognition. It defeated the Ancien Régime, in which recognition was given only to a select few people and which had an intricate system of levels of nobility and rights, something Herder disliked. In a new society, recognition became universal. Taylor calls this process a universalization of dignity. It made equalization of rights and entitlements one of Western societies’ central preoccupations. Separating citizens into classes with different privileges, laws, and obligations proclaimed the biggest sin, which sparked a debate as some believed that achieving universal suffrage and equality before the law were the final points in the universalization of recognition. At the same time, others believed that equality entails ensuring the same socioeconomic positions of citizens. This tension remains prominent to this day, just like the new tension between individual and collective identities and rights, because the Revolution did not only create citizens with their inalienable rights but also the French nation and nationalism.  

Fukuyama, augmenting Ernest Gellner’s theory, which links nationalism to industrialization, provides an interesting explanation for the emergence of strong national identities. Urbanization and abolition of the traditional, agrarian environment with limited choices and preordained ways of life led to confusion, not liberation. The encounter with different cultures, religions, and lifestyles, the abundance of consumer products, and the relative anonymity in a big city opened up the possibility for behaviors previously unacceptable, but also the sense of uncertainty about the world and oneself. It led to the questions people had never asked before, the questions of who they were deep inside. The quest for authenticity went into the masses, and many naturally preferred “joining” collective identities such as nations, which afforded them psychological comfort and a sense of belonging in the new confusing reality. Ortega y Gasset thus described the modern man: “He feels lost amid his own abundance. With more means at its disposal, more knowledge, more technique than ever, it turns out that the world today goes the same way as the worst of worlds that have been; it simply drifts.”⁶

The confusion of modern life, the rise of nationalism, standardization, and the striving for homogeneity in the industrial society did not transform, however, the “third part of the soul,” the pervasive Platonian thymos. The universalization of dignity led to the reactionary desire to be different from everybody else and to get recognition for one’s uniqueness. The response to this new desire, the desire that is a counterweight to the politics of universal dignity, became known as the politics of difference. Certain groups within society started to demand a special recognition of their distinctness (feminists, LGBT movement, ethnic and cultural minorities) and oppose the homogenizing sway of the new democracy. They perceive that their distinctness has been ignored, glossed over, and assimilated into a dominant or majority identity. This homogenization contradicts the ideal of authenticity and leads to the politics of difference,⁷ which, at this point, becomes indistinguishable from identity politics. These politics were further amplified by the rise of the mental health-preoccupied “therapeutic society” with its excessive focus on self-worth, subjectivity, personal emotions, and desires. It placed personal happiness and mental well-being at the center of attention. Therapeutic and identity-obsessed society created so-called “trigger warnings,” “safe spaces,” and introduced new books to the educational programs written by oppressed groups ignoring their intellectual value (as their main purpose is to “represent” and to preserve students’ mental health and good feeling about who they are.)⁸ 

These are the philosophical roots of some of the most prominent questions we are grappling with today as a society. These developments exemplify the emergence of modern identity politics, and the struggle for recognition, laying the foundation for woke scholarship and activism of various sorts.

1. To read more about the principles of the national conservatism: https://nationalconservatism.org/national-conservatism-a-statement-of-principles/ ↩︎
2. Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994) ↩︎
3. Jean-François Braunstein, La religion woke (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2023), 79, 81. 
   Élizabeth Lévy, “Le Débat Est Un Combat,” CONSTRUCTIVE: The Contributions of the Building to the Great Debates of Our Time 61, no. 1 (2022): https://doi.org/10.3917/const.061.0080.  ↩︎
4. Eric Kaufmann, “The Politics of the Culture Wars in Contemporary Canada,” Macdonald-Laurier Institute, February 21, 2024, https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/20240129_Culture-wars-Kaufmann_PAPER-B-v2-FINAL.pdf ↩︎
5. Charles Taylor, “The Sources of Authenticity,” in The Ethics of Authenticity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), 30.  ↩︎
6. José Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt of the Masses (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1930), 44. ↩︎
7. Taylor, Multiculturalism, 38 ↩︎
8. Braunstein, La Religion Woke, 87-102; Fukuyama, Identity, 91-104 ↩︎